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Corporate governance can have significant effects on firm value. Through ensuring that
managers act in shareholders’ interest, it reduces the agency costs arising from the separation
of ownership and control. In turn, traditional theories argue that concentrated ownership
is critical for effective governance, since only large investors have incentives to monitor the
manager and, if necessary, intervene to correct value-destructive actions.
However, many firms in reality have multiple small blockholders (Faccio and Lang 2002;
Maury and Pajuste 2005; Laeven and Levine 2007; Holderness 2009). Such a structure appears
to be suboptimal for governance, as splitting equity between numerous shareholders leads to
a free-rider problem: each investor individually has insufficient incentives to bear the cost
of monitoring. Should policymakers encourage more concentrated stakes, as suggested by
existing models, or can such a structure in fact be efficient? The evidence also demonstrates
heterogeneity in blockholder structures. What causes the number of blockholders to vary across
firms?
These questions are the focus of this paper. We demonstrate that a multiple blockholder
structure can be efficient, and identify the factors that determine the optimal blockholder
structure. While splitting a block reduces the effectiveness of direct intervention, it increases
the power of a second governance mechanism: trading. By trading on private information,
blockholders move the stock price towards fundamental value, and thus cause it to more closely
reflect the effort exerted by the manager to enhance firm value. If the manager shirks or
extracts private benefits, blockholders follow the “Wall Street Rule” of “voting with their feet”
and selling to liquidity traders. This drives down the stock price, reducing the manager’s equity
compensation and thus punishing him ex post. However, such a mechanism only elicits effort
ex ante if it is dynamically consistent. Once the manager has taken his action, blockholders
cannot change it and are only concerned with maximizing their trading profits. A single
blockholder will strategically limit her order to reduce the revelation of her private information.
By contrast, multiple blockholders trade aggressively to compete for profits, as in a Cournot
oligopoly. Total quantities (here, trading volumes) are higher than under monopoly, so more
information is impounded in prices and they more closely reflect fundamental value and thus
the manager’s effort.1 Multiple blockholders therefore serve as a commitment device to reward
or punish the manager ex post for his actions.
We derive an interior solution for the optimal number of blockholders that maximizes firm
value. This optimum arises from a trade-off between intervention and trading: fewer blocks
maximize intervention, but more blocks increase trading. Therefore, this optimum is increasing
in the value created by managerial effort and decreasing in the value created by blockholder
intervention. If blockholders are passive, such as mutual funds, they are more effective at
governing through trading than intervention, and so a large number is optimal. By contrast,
with activists and venture capitalists, concentrated ownership is efficient. We show that the
firm value optimum may differ from the social optimum that maximizes total surplus (firm
value net of effort costs), and the private optimum that would be endogenously chosen by
the blockholders if they retraded their stakes to maximize their combined net payoffs (which
include informed trading profits). However, the above comparative statics are the same for all
three optima.
In the core model, blockholders are automatically informed about firm value. We ex-
1The 2007 hedge fund crisis is a prominent example of the substantial price changes that result from multiple
investors trading in the same direction.
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tend the model to costly information acquisition. In equilibrium some blockholders may stay
uninformed, because trading profits are insufficient to justify information gathering. Since
uninformed blockholders do not trade, and reduce intervention by diluting ownership, they
lower firm value. Thus, the optimal number of blockholders is bounded above, to ensure that
competition in trading is sufficiently low that trading profits are adequate to motivate all block-
holders to acquire information. If net trading profits increase, this bound is loosened and so
the number of blockholders rises. This in turn occurs if market liquidity and the blockholders’
informational advantage increase, and the cost of information falls.
The core model assumes that blockholder and manager efforts are substitutes, with in-
dependent effects on firm value. For example, the firm value impact of managerial effort to
launch new products is unaffected by the extent to which blockholders extract private benefits
or monitor managerial perks. However, in some cases there may be positive complementarities,
where the marginal productivity of one party’s effort is increasing in other party’s effort – for
example, the blockholder formulates a strategy which the manager implements. We model
positive complementarities by specifying that firm value depends only on the lower of the man-
ager’s and blockholders’ output levels (where “output” is effort scaled by productivity). Since
managerial effort is only productive if it is accompanied by high blockholder effort (and vice
versa), the optimal number of blockholders balances the output levels of both parties. The
effect of effort productivity changes direction: the optimum is now decreasing (increasing) in
the effectiveness of the manager’s (blockholders’) effort. If blockholder effort is ineffective,
concentrated ownership is necessary to “boost” blockholder output so that it is at a similar
level to the manager’s output.
The opposite case is negative complementarities, where the marginal productivity of one
party’s effort is decreasing in the other party’s output. This occurs if blockholders correct
managerial shirking: blockholders are most effective if the manager exerts low effort or con-
sumes private benefits. We model negative complementarities by specifying that firm value
depends only on the higher of the output levels of the two parties. The optimum is determined
entirely by the more effective action, and ignores trade-off considerations with the less effective
action. The efficient number of blockholders is either very low (if blockholder effort is relatively
effective) or very high (if managerial effort is relatively effective).
Finally, the optimal number of blockholders is also increasing in the manager’s and block-
holders’ relative weighting on the stock price rather than long-run fundamental value (e.g. as a
result of short vesting periods or liquidity needs), since this augments the importance of stock
price informativeness for their effort choices.
We close by discussing empirical implications, which fall under two broad themes. First, the
model suggests a different way of thinking about the interaction between multiple blockholders,
that can give rise to new avenues for empirical research. Prior models perceive blockholders
as competing for private benefits, and so existing empirical studies of multiple blockholders
typically focus on rent extraction (e.g. Laeven and Levine (2007)). Our paper suggests that
future research may be motivated by conceptualizing them as informed traders, competing
for trading profits. This link between blockholders and the microstructure literature gener-
ates a new set of predictions relating to informed trading and financial markets. The model
predicts that blockholder structure impacts price efficiency and consequently firm value, and
their power in exerting governance depends on microstructure factors such as liquidity and the
blockholders’ information advantage. One recent example of such a research direction is Gal-
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lagher, Gardner and Swan (2010), who show that an increase in the number of blockholders
reduces trading profits, augments price efficiency, and leads to subsequent improvements in
firm performance. Gorton, Huang and Kang (2010) find that price informativeness is increas-
ing in the number of blockholders; Boehmer and Kelley (2009) document that it is rising in
ownership dispersion. Bharath, Jayaraman and Nagar (2010) find that liquidity improves firm
value particularly in firms with multiple blockholders, and Smith and Swan (2008) show that
trading by multiple blockholders disciplines managerial compensation. More generally, these
implications contribute to the broader literature linking financial markets to corporate finance
and demonstrating the real effects of financial markets.2
Second, the theory implies that the number of blockholders is important as both a de-
pendent and independent variable in empirical studies. Existing research often focuses on
explaining total institutional ownership or the size of the largest blockholder. This paper sug-
gests that the number of blockholders is another important feature of governance structures.
As a dependent variable, the model generates testable predictions for the factors that should
cause blockholder structure to vary across firms, potentially explaining the heterogeneity ob-
served empirically. As an independent variable, the number of blockholders is a driver of both
market efficiency and the strength of corporate governance. Empirical papers frequently use
total institutional ownership as a gauge of price efficiency, since institutions are typically more
informed than retail investors. However, market efficiency requires not only that investors be
informed, but that they impound their information into prices and so the number of informed
shareholders is a relevant additional factor. Similarly, governance is typically proxied for us-
ing total institutional ownership, or the holding of the largest shareholder, but the number of
blockholders is also important. See Bharath et al. (2010) and Gorton et al. (2010) for recent
empirical studies of the effect of blockholder numbers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews related literature. Section 2 presents
the model and analyzes the effect of blockholder structure on both intervention and trading.
Section 3 derives the optimal number of blockholders that maximizes firm value, total surplus,
and the blockholders’ payoff. Section 4 considers extensions, Section 5 discusses empirical
implications, and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs not in the main text,
some extensions, and other peripheral material.3
1. Related Literature
The vast majority of blockholder models involve the large shareholder adding value through
direct intervention, or “voice” as termed by Hirshman (1970). This can involve implementing
profitable projects or correcting managerial inefficiency. In Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati,
Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994), Maug (1998, 2002), Kahn and Winton (1998) and Mello and
Repullo (2004), a larger block is unambiguously more desirable as it reduces the free-rider
problem and maximizes incentives to intervene.
By contrast, Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) show that the optimal block size is finite
if blockholder intervention can deter managerial initiative ex ante. Bolton and von Thadden
(1998) and Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) achieve a finite optimum through a different
2See, e.g., Fishman and Hagerty (1989), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrah-
manyam and Titman (1999), Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), Goldstein and
Guembel (2008), Calcagno and Heider (2008), Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2010).
3All Appendices are available online at http://www.sfsrfs.org.
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channel, as too large a block reduces free float. While these papers only consider a single
shareholder, Pagano and Roell (1998) point out that if the finite optimum is lower than the
total external financing required, the entrepreneur will need to raise funds from additional
shareholders. Although this leads to a multiple blockholder structure, the extra blockholders
play an entirely passive role: they are merely a “budget-breaker” to provide the remaining
funds. Replacing the additional blockholders by creditors or dispersed shareholders would
have the same effect. In this paper, all blockholders play an active role. In Winton (1993),
a multiple blockholder structure arises as investors face wealth constraints, rather than from
price efficiency considerations.
Two recent papers by Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009) analyze an alterna-
tive governance mechanism: trading (also commonly referred to as “exit”). Informed trading
causes prices to more accurately reflect fundamental value, in turn inducing the manager to
undertake actions that enhance value.4 The survey evidence of McCahery, Sautner and Starks
(2010) finds that trading is the primary governance mechanism used by institutions; Parrino,
Sias and Starks (2003) and Chen, Harford and Li (2007) document direct evidence of gover-
nance through trading. However, Admati and Pfleiderer and Edmans both consider a single
blockholder and do not feature intervention.
Attari, Banerjee and Noe (2006), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), and Aghion, Bolton
and Tirole (2004) feature a blockholder who can only intervene and a speculative agent who
can only trade. The blockholder does not trade; even though the speculator does, such trading
does not exert governance as there is no managerial decision. These theories thus consider
intervention only. Noe (2002) features multiple blockholders who both intervene and trade.
Since stock price informativeness has no effect on managerial effort, blockholder trading again
does not exert governance.5 In Khanna and Mathews (2010), blockholder trading does improve
firm value, but through the different channel of countering manipulation by a short-seller.
In our model, all blockholders engage in both intervention and trading; the latter affects
the manager’s incentives and thus exerts governance. Indeed, McCahery et al. find that
institutional blockholders use both governance mechanisms frequently.6 To our knowledge,
this paper is the first theory that analyzes both of these major governance mechanisms, and
the tradeoffs between them.
Most existing multiple blockholder theories focus on the formation of coalitions to win vot-
ing contests (Dhillon and Rossetto 2009) or extract private benefits (Zwiebel 1995; Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon 2000; Mueller and Wärneryd 2001; Bloch and Hege 2003; Maury and Pajuste
4In Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Calcagno and Heider (2008) and Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2010),
price efficiency is also desirable as it helps monitor management. In Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), efficient prices
reduce the cost of raising funds for a high-quality firm. In Fishman and Hagerty (1989), efficient prices improve
the manager’s investment decisions. These papers do not analyze the effect of blockholder structure on price
efficiency and there is no blockholder intervention. In Fulghieri and Lukin, price efficiency is enhanced via
security design; in Fishman and Hagerty it is enhanced by firms’ voluntary disclosures.
5Similarly, the single blockholder models of Maug (1998, 2002), Kahn and Winton (1998), Mello and Repullo
(2004), Brav and Mathews (2010), and Kalay and Pant (2010) allow the blockholder either to intervene or to
sell her stake (in the last two papers, the intervention occurs through voting). However, trading again does not
exert governance, and so these papers are theories of intervention only.
6While trading is the primary mechanism (undertaken by 80% of institutions), 66% vote against management
and 55% engage in discussions with the board. Six other channels of intervention as used by at least 10% of
respondents. Institutions can both trade freely on information and engage in intervention because the above
intervention mechanisms do not require them to have a board seat and become a firm insider.
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All blockholders Outside blockholders
N Number of firms % of firms with Number of firms % of firms with
with N blockholders ≥ N blockholders with N blockholders ≥ N blockholders
0 152 100% 249 100%
1 217 88% 289 80%
2 287 70% 284 57%
3 264 47% 213 34%
4 170 26% 116 17%
5 88 12% 62 7%
6 40 5% 18 2%
7 17 2% 7 1%
8 4 0% 2 0%
9 1 0% 0 0%
Table 1: Frequency of multiple blockholders for 1,240 U.S. firms. This table reports the
frequency of blockholder structures for U.S. firms in 2001 using data from Dlugosz et al.
(2006).
2005; Gomes and Novaes 2006).7 This paper derives a multiple blockholder structure through
a quite different channel – its effect on governance through trading, rather than control con-
tests. By studying different blockholder actions, the model generates a new range of empirical
predictions, in particular those relating to informed trading and financial markets, and more
broadly links together the previously disparate literatures on blockholders and microstructure.
We now turn from related theories to the empirical facts that motivate our model. Table
1 illustrates the prevalence of multiple blockholders using U.S. data for 2001 from Dlugosz et
al. (2006). They define a blockholder as a shareholder with at least 5% of a firm’s equity.
The table illustrates that 70% of firms have multiple blockholders, and 26% of firms have at
least four blockholders. Focusing on outside blockholders, these figures remain sizable at 57%
and 17%. Hence, not only do most firms have multiple blockholders, but even among such
firms, the number of blockholders varies. Therefore, we seek not only to show that a multiple
blockholder structure can be optimal, but also explain why blockholder numbers vary across
firms. Hand-collected data from Holderness (2009) gives consistent results, showing that 74%
of firms having multiple blockholders and 26% have at least four blockholders.8
Turning to overseas, Laeven and Levine (2007) find that 34% of European firms have more
than one blockholder; Maury and Pajuste (2005) document a figure of 48% for Finnish firms.
Using Western European data made available by Faccio and Lang (2002) we find a similar
ratio of 39%. All these figures are sizable but somewhat lower than the U.S. data, because the
above papers require an investor to have at least 10% of the voting rights to be a blockholder,
7Another explanation is that regulation (e.g. Section 13(d) filing requirements upon acquisition of a 5%
stake, or becoming classified as an insider upon acquisition of a 10% stake) prevents investors from building
large blocks and thus forces firms to be held by multiple blockholders. Existing theories advocating a single
large blockholder would suggest that such institutional constraints lead to inefficient ownership structures; this
paper reaches a different conclusion.
8The Holderness (2009) paper does not contain the frequency of multiple blockholders. We thank Cliff
Holderness for providing us with these figures using his underlying data.
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Action Stage
1. Manager takes unobservable
action a at cost a
2. Blockholder takes observable
action bi at cost bi.
3. Blockholder i observes firm
value
ṽ = φa log(1 + a) + φb log(1 +
∑
i bi) + η̃
Trading Stage
1. Blockholder i submits
order flow xi(ṽ).
2. Liquidity traders submit
order flow ε̃.
3. Market maker observes
total order flow
ỹ =
∑
i xi + ε̃
and sets price p = E[ṽ|ỹ].
Figure 1: Timeline of the model
in part motivated by existing theories based on control contests. While a 10% stake may be
necessary to exert control, in our model a blockholder is simply a shareholder who has greater
information than the market and so the lower threshold of Dlugosz et al. is more appropriate.
Even a stake below 5% may be sufficient to gain access to management or give incentives to
analyze the firm in detail (for example, mutual funds typically hold under 5%). Under a lower
threshold, the prevalence of multiple blockholders and heterogeneity in structures will be even
greater. Our model does not assume that blockholders have control rights – a blockholder is
simply any party with a sufficient stake to induce intervention, who also has private information
and the ability to trade on this information.9 It thus can apply to shareholders with less than
5% and suggests that empirical studies of blockholders may wish to use data sources other
than 13d filings to identify sizable shareholders below the 5% threshold (see, e.g., Gallagher,
Gardner and Swan (2010)).
2. Model and Analysis
Our model consists of a game between the manager, a market maker and the I blockholders
of the firm. The game has two stages, and the timeline is given in Figure 1.
In the first stage, the manager and blockholders take actions that affect firm value. Firm
value is given by
ṽ = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) + η̃, (1)
where a ∈ [0,∞) represents the action taken by the manager, bi ∈ [0,∞) represents the action
taken by blockholder i, and η̃ is normally distributed noise with mean zero and variance σ2η .
The manager incurs personal cost a when taking action a, while each blockholder i incurs
personal cost bi when taking action bi.
10 The manager’s action is broadly defined to encom-
pass any decision that improves firm value but is personally costly, such as exerting effort or
9For U.S. firms, insiders will typically not meet this definition of a blockholder since they are prohibited from
trading on material non-public information by insider trading laws; Table 1 therefore differentiates between
inside and outside blockholders. In countries where insider trading laws are weak or not enforced, and insiders
do not face other trading restrictions such as wealth constraints or risk aversion, both insiders and outsiders
can be considered blockholders in the model.
10Firm value depends on the logarithm of the combined blockholder effort level, and the action has a linear
cost to each blockholder. This functional form ensures that adding blockholders does not change the available
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forgoing private benefits. We call these actions “initiative” and “managerial rent extraction”
respectively. Similarly, the blockholder’s action can involve advising the manager (“advising”),
inhibiting managerial perks (“perk prevention”) or extracting private benefits for themselves
(“blockholder rent extraction.”)11 Section 5 discusses which types of action will likely be most
important in a given setting. The parameter φa (φb) measures the productivity of manager
(blockholder) effort. We use the term “effort” to refer to a and bi and “output” to refer to
φa log(1 + a) and φb log(1 +
∑
i bi), i.e. effort scaled by its productivity. To avoid having to
deal with the boundary cases where a and/or bi are zero and explicitly analyze non-negativity
constraints, we impose technical restrictions on the parameters to guarantee that both are
strictly positive. Sufficient conditions are given in Appendix A.12
In the core model, the manager’s and blockholders’ actions are perfect substitutes, with
independent effects on firm value. This benchmark case is appropriate in a number of settings.
For example, if blockholders primarily impact the firm through rent extraction, this erodes firm
value regardless of the manager’s initiative or rent extraction. If the key managerial action is
initiative (e.g. designing new products or building client relationships) and blockholders mainly
block perks or consume private benefits themselves, these are also independent. However, in
some situations, there may be positive or negative complementarities between the manager’s
and blockholders’ actions. These are analyzed in Section 4.2.
Action a is privately observed by the manager, as in any moral hazard problem. In the core
model, we assume that bi is public. This assumption is made only for tractability, since it allows
the trading and effort decisions to be solved separately. The key mechanism through which
the paper justifies multiple blockholders, that a rise in I generates competition in trading, is
unaffected by whether bi is observable. In Section 4.4 we allow for bi to be private.
There is one share outstanding. The risk-neutral manager owns α shares, and each risk-
neutral blockholder holds β/I shares, where α+β < 1. Our analysis focuses exclusively on the
optimal number of blockholders (I) among which a given level of concentrated ownership is
divided, and thus holds the amount of concentrated ownership (β) constant. This separates our
paper from previous literature that analyzes the optimal β. For example, Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) and Maug (1998, 2002) show that a higher β raises incentives to intervene, but this
must be traded off against the potential reduction in managerial initiative (Burkart, Gromb
and Panunzi 1997) and free float (Bolton and von Thadden 1998). In this model, free float
is fixed at 1 − α − β and plays no role. Endogenizing β and allowing liquidity (introduced
shortly) to depend on free float will lead to the same trade-off as these earlier papers.13
technology (in addition, it leads to substantial tractability). The common assumption of a quadratic cost
and a linear effect of bi on ṽ is inappropriate here: with a convex cost function, the blockholders’ technology
would improve if there are multiple small blockholders, since each would be operating at the low marginal cost
part of the curve. A single blockholder would be able to reduce monitoring costs by dividing herself up into
multiple small “units”, and increase total effort. Instead, the linear cost means that the monitoring technology
is constant, and so there is no mechanical reduction in monitoring costs from splitting a block.
11See Barclay and Holderness (1989) for a description of the private benefits that blockholders can extract.
Unlike in earlier theories of multiple blockholders, here blockholders do not compete (with either each other or
the manager) to consume private benefits.
12The analysis of perfect negative complementarities (Proposition 10) does allow for a or
∑
ibi to be zero,
and indeed shows that the optimum involves one of these terms being zero.
13We could also extend the model by introducing managerial risk aversion and endogenizing α. Then, the
increased price efficiency that results from a greater number of blockholders will lead to the optimal contract
involving a greater relative weight on equity compensation versus other performance measures: see Holmstrom
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In the second stage of the game, the blockholders, noise traders, and a market maker trade
the firm’s equity. As in Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), each blockholder observes firm value ṽ
perfectly, while noise traders are uninformed. Section 4.1 extends the model to costly infor-
mation acquisition and Appendix B shows that our results are unchanged if each blockholder
obtains an imperfect signal of ṽ: we only require that blockholders have superior information to
atomistic investors.14 This superior information can be motivated by a number of underlying
assumptions. Blockholders’ large stakes may give them greater access to information: given
their voting power, management is more willing to meet with them. In reality, managers meet
large institutional investors but not households. Even if blockholders have the same access to
information as other investors, they have stronger incentives to engage in costly analysis of
this information. For example, mutual funds undertake detailed analysis of public information
to form their own valuations. Edmans (2009) microfounds this relationship between block size
and informedness. If there are short-sales constraints (or nontrivial short-sales costs), block-
holders can sell more if information turns out to be negative. Since information is more useful
to them, they have a greater incentive to acquire it in the first place. Several empirical stud-
ies indeed find that blockholders are better informed than other investors and impound their
information into prices through trading. Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) and Chen, Harford
and Li (2007) find that blockholders have superior information about negative firm prospects,
which they use to vote with their feet. Bushee and Goodman (2007) show that blockholders
trade on private rather than public information. Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) and
Sias, Starks and Titman (2006) demonstrate that such blockholder trading has a permanent
effect on stock prices (suggesting the price moves are due to information rather than liquidity)
and Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders impound firm-specific information into
prices.15
After observing ṽ, each blockholder submits a market order xi(ṽ). Noise traders, who
trade for exogenous liquidity reasons, submit a market order ε̃ ∼ N (0, σ2ε), where ε and η
are independent. We use the term “liquidity” to refer to σε. After observing total order flow
ỹ =
∑
i x̃i + ε̃, the competitive market maker sets the price p̃ equal to expected firm value.
The manager’s objective is to maximize the market value of his shares less the cost of effort.
Each blockholder maximizes her trading profits, plus the fundamental value of her shares, less
her cost of effort.16 In Section 4.3, we allow the objective functions of all players to depend on
and Tirole (1993) and Calcagno and Heider (2008). As in the present paper, managerial effort unambiguously
rises (see Chen and Swan (2010).)
14Appendix C allows signal precision to be increasing in the blockholder’s individual stake and thus fall with
I. This does not change any results as long as signal precision does not decline so rapidly with I that this
outweighs the beneficial effect of greater I on competition in trading.
15Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003), Sias, Starks and Titman (2006) and Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2010)
document that blockholders typically trade on the market rather than using a negotiated block trade. This is
because only the former method allows them to trade on their information by camouflaging with noise traders
(as in Kyle (1985).) Blockholders cannot trade on information in a negotiated trade because the counterparty
engages in extensive due diligence since she is trading a large stake. Indeed, Barclay and Holderness (1991) find
that negotiated block trades are rare and trades lead to stock price increases, inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the selling blockholder is exiting on negative information. The event-study returns are independent of
whether the block is traded at a premium or discount, rejecting the view that the trading parties have superior
information to the market.
16Each blockholder thus maximizes her individual objective function. The results are unchanged if block-
holders can co-ordinate (either to share the costs of intervention, or limit their trading volumes), but the cost
is increasing in the number of co-ordinating parties. An increase in I reduces the co-ordination costs for both
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both the stock price and fundamental value.
We solve for the equilibrium of the game by backward induction.
2.1 The Trading Stage
To proceed by backward induction, we take the decisions a of the manager and bi of the
blockholders as given. (In equilibrium, these conjectures will be correct and equal the actions
derived subsequently in Proposition 3.) The trading stage of the game is similar to Kyle
(1985) and its extensions to multiple informed investors (Kyle 1984; Admati and Pfleiderer
1988; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 1993.)
Proposition 1. (Trading Equilibrium) The unique linear equilibrium of the trading stage
is symmetric and has the form:
xi(ṽ) = γ (ṽ − φa log (1 + a) − φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)) ∀i (2)
p(ỹ) = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) + λỹ, (3)
where
λ =
√
I
I + 1
ση
σε
(4)
γ =
1√
I
σε
ση
, (5)
and a and bi are the market maker’s and blockholders’ conjectures regarding the actions. Each
blockholder’s expected trading profits are given by
1√
I(I + 1)
σησε. (6)
Trading profits are increasing in ση, the blockholders’ informational advantage, and σε,
their ability to profit from information by trading with liquidity investors. In addition, ag-
gregate blockholder trading profits are decreasing in I, because multiple blockholders compete
as in a Cournot oligopoly and trade aggressively. While aggressive trading reduces aggregate
profits, it also impounds more information into prices. Our definition of price informative-
ness is E
[
dp̃
dṽ
]
, the expected change in price for a given change in firm value. This definition
is particularly relevant for our setting as it measures the incentives to improve fundamental
value of an agent compensated according to the stock price. It will thus be used later to derive
the manager’s optimal action. The common measure used in the microstructure literature is
(Var(ṽ) − Var(ṽ|p̃)) / Var(ṽ), the proportion of the variance of ṽ that is captured by prices.
Appendix D shows that these measures are equivalent.
The next proposition calculates price informativeness.
Proposition 2. (Price Informativeness) Price informativeness is equal to I/(I + 1).
intervention and trading, with the same effects as in the core model.
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Price informativeness is increasing in I. As I approaches infinity, prices become fully
informative. On the other hand, in the monopolistic Kyle model (I = 1), the blockholder
limits her order, and so prices reveal only one-half of her private information.
The positive link between the number of blockholders and price informativeness does not
arise because a greater number of informed agents mechanically increases the amount of infor-
mation in the market. Indeed, a single blockholder already has a perfect signal of fundamental
value; since she faces no trading constraints, she could theoretically impound this entire infor-
mation into prices. The amount of information in the economy is independent of I; the effect
on price informativeness instead arises entirely from competition in trading.
As is standard in Kyle-type models, liquidity σε has no effect on price informativeness.
From (5), greater noise trading allows blockholders to trade more aggressively. This increase
in informed trading exactly counterbalances the effect of increased noise and leaves price in-
formativeness unchanged. In Section 4.1 we show that liquidity has a positive effect on price
informativeness under costly information acquisition.
2.2 The Action Stage
We now solve for the actions of the manager and the blockholders in the first stage. There is
a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3. (Optimal Actions) The manager’s optimal action is
a = φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
− 1 (7)
and combined blockholder actions are
∑
i
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)
− 1. (8)
In a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal action of each blockholder is
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
. (9)
Proof The manager maximizes the market value of his shares, less the cost of effort:
E [αp̃ − a] . (10)
When setting the price p̃, the market maker uses his conjecture for the manager’s action a.
Therefore, the manager’s actual action affects the price only through its influence on ṽ, and
thus blockholders’ order flow. The manager’s first-order condition is given by:
α
(
E
[
dp̃
dṽ
])(
φa
1 + a
)
− 1 = 0. (11)
From Proposition 2, his optimal action is therefore
a = α
(
I
I + 1
)
φa − 1. (12)
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Each blockholder maximizes her trading profits, plus the fundamental value of her shares,
less her cost of effort. From (6), the blockholder’s trading profits do not depend on bi, because
it is public and thus does not affect her informational advantage. Therefore, blockholder i
simply chooses bi to maximize the fundamental value of her shares, less her cost of effort:
E
[(
β
I
)
ṽ − bi
]
. (13)
Her first-order condition is given by
∑
i
bi =
β
I
φb − 1
and so in a symmetric equilibrium, the action of blockholder i is
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
. (14)
There also exist asymmetric equilibria, but
∑
i bi is uniquely defined. Since firm value de-
pends on the sum of blockholder efforts, there is no loss of generality by focusing on symmetric
equilibria.
The manager’s action a is the product of three variables: the effectiveness of effort φa, his
equity stake α, and price informativeness I
I+1
. It is increasing in I as a higher I augments price
informativeness, and so the stock price more closely reflects the firm’s fundamental value and
thus the manager’s effort. In effect, blockholder trading rewards managerial effort ex post by
impounding its effects into the stock price, therefore inducing it ex ante. The dynamic con-
sistency of this reward mechanism depends on the number of blockholders. Critically, trading
occurs after the manager has taken his action, at which point shareholders are concerned only
with maximizing their trading profits. A single blockholder optimizes her profits by limiting
her order, at the expense of price informativeness. Therefore, the promise of rewarding effort by
bidding up the price to fundamental value is not credible. By contrast, multiple blockholders
trade aggressively, augmenting price informativeness, and thus constitute a commitment de-
vice to reward the manager ex post for his actions. While such aggressive trading is motivated
purely by the private desire to maximize individual profits in the presence of competition, it
has a social benefit by eliciting managerial effort.
As is standard, combined blockholder effort
∑
i bi is decreasing in I, owing to the free-rider
problem. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the effect of I on intervention and trading.
The co-ordination problems and externalities created by splitting a block play opposing roles in
intervention and trading. For intervention, the externalities are positive: intervention improves
the value of other shareholders’ stakes, but this effect is not internalized by the individual
blockholder. Since these externalities are positive, there is “too little” intervention with mul-
tiple blockholders, from a firm value standpoint. For trading, the externalities are negative.
Higher trading volumes reveal more information to the market maker, leading to a less at-
tractive price for other informed traders. Blockholders trade “too much” from the standpoint
of maximizing combined profits. However, firm value does not depend on trading profits as
they are a mere transfer from liquidity traders to blockholders. Instead, “too much” trading
is beneficial for firm value as it increases price informativeness and induces effort ex ante.
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3. The Optimal Number of Blockholders
This section derives the optimal number of blockholders. We start by deriving the optimal
number that maximizes firm value, and then analyze the social optimum (that maximizes total
surplus) and the private optimum (that maximizes the total payoff to blockholders).
Proposition 4. (Firm Value Optimum) The number I∗ of blockholders that maximizes
firm value is17:
I∗ =
φa − φb
φb
. (15)
Proof From Proposition 3, expected firm value is:
E[ṽ] = φa log
[
φaα
(
I
I + 1
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
. (16)
The first-order condition with respect to I is given by:
φa − φb − φbI
I + I2
= 0. (17)
Î = (φa − φb)/φb satisfies the first order condition. Since the left hand side of (17) is positive
for I < Î and negative for I > Î, I∗ is indeed a maximum.
The number I∗ of blockholders that maximizes firm value solves the trade-off between the
positive effect of more blockholders on managerial effort, and the negative effect on blockholder
intervention. The optimum is therefore increasing in φa, the productivity of the manager’s
effort, and declining in φb, the productivity of blockholder intervention.
While Proposition 4 is concerned with maximizing firm value, the social optimum maxi-
mizes total surplus, which also takes into account the effort costs borne by the manager and
blockholders. In theory, the social optimum would be chosen by a social planner. If the noise
traders are the firm’s atomistic shareholders (as in Kahn and Winton (1998) and Bolton and
von Thadden (1998)), it will also be chosen by the initial owner when taking the firm public,
since IPO proceeds will equal total surplus. The owner will have to compensate the blockhold-
ers (in the form of a lower issue price) for their expected intervention costs, and the manager
for his effort in the form of a higher wage. Trading profits have no effect on IPO proceeds:
while blockholders will pay a premium in expectation of trading gains, small shareholders will
demand discounts to offset their future losses.
Proposition 5. (Social Optimum) The number I∗soc of blockholders that maximizes total
surplus is the unique positive solution to
φa
I (I + 1)
− φb
I
− φaα
(I + 1)2
+
φbβ
I2
= 0, (18)
which may be higher or lower than I∗. I∗soc is increasing in φa and β, and decreasing in φb and
α.
17In reality, the number of blockholders must be a strictly positive integer. To economize on notation, we
ignore such technicalities when stating I∗. If φa−φbφb < 1, the optimal number is 1. If
φa−φb
φb
is a non-integer,
the optimal number is found by comparing (16) under the two adjacent integers.
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Proof Total surplus is given by:
φa log
[
φaα
(
I
I + 1
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
− φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
− φbβ
1
I
+ 2. (19)
Differentiating yields (18). Appendix A proves that there is a unique positive solution and
that it maximizes (19). It also addresses the comparative statics.
Compared to (16), (19) contains two additional terms. Increasing I raises the cost of
managerial effort, but reduces the combined cost of blockholder effort. The social optimum
may thus be higher or lower than the firm value optimum. If β rises, total blockholder costs
φbβ
1
I
− 1 become more important in the social welfare function, and so I∗soc rises to reduce
these costs by lowering intervention. Conversely, a rise in α increases the importance of the
manager’s costs and thus lowers I∗soc. The comparative statics with respect to φa and φb are
the same as in Proposition 4.
Finally, we analyze the privately optimal division of β that would maximize blockholders’
combined payoffs. This optimum would be endogenously chosen by the blockholders themselves
and is robust to re-trading.
Proposition 6. (Private Optimum) The number I∗priv of blockholders that maximizes total
blockholders’ payoff is the unique positive solution to
β
[
φa
I (I + 1)
− φb
I
+
φb
I2
]
− (I − 1)
2
√
I(I + 1)2
σησε = 0, (20)
which may be higher or lower than I∗, and higher or lower than I∗soc. I
∗
priv is increasing in φa
and β, and decreasing in φb and σησε.
Proof Total blockholders’ payoff is given by:
β
{
φa log
[
φaα
(
I
I + 1
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
1
I
]}
− φbβ
1
I
+ 1 +
√
I
I + 1
σησε. (21)
Differentiating yields (20). Appendix A proves that there is a unique positive solution and
that it maximizes (21). It also addresses the comparative statics.
The blockholders’ objective function differs from firm value in three ways. They only enjoy
β of any increase in firm value; bear the costs of intervention; and are concerned with informed
trading profits. Increasing I above I∗ has an ambiguous effect: it reduces the combined costs
of intervention, but also reduces total trading profits by exacerbating competition. Therefore,
as with the social optimum, the private optimum may be higher or lower than the firm value
optimum. An increase in β causes blockholders’ effort costs to become more important in the
objective function and so I∗priv rises. If σησε increases, trading profits become more important
and so I∗priv falls to lower competition.
The blockholders’ objective function also differs from the social welfare function in three
ways. Blockholders are concerned with trading profits and only β of firm value, but ignore
the cost of managerial effort. Again, the sum of these three effects is ambiguous. Increasing
I above I∗soc both reduces profits and increases the manager’s costs. The comparative statics
with respect to φa and φb are the same as in Propositions 4 and 5.
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4. Extensions
4.1 Costly Information Acquisition
In the core model, blockholders are endowed with private information about firm value ṽ. In
this subsection, they are initially uninformed but can learn ṽ by paying a cost c in the first
stage of the game. Blockholders that do not pay this cost remain uninformed in the second
stage. To solve this modified version of the model, we again use backward induction.
Proposition 7. (Equilibrium With Costly Information) Let J be the number of block-
holders that acquire information in the first stage of the game. Then in the unique linear
equilibrium of the trading stage, the I − J uninformed blockholders do not trade in aggregate.
The J informed blockholders submit demands as in (2) and the market maker sets the price as
in (3) with
λ =
√
J
J + 1
ση
σε
(22)
γ =
1√
J
σε
ση
. (23)
In the first stage of the game, the manager’s optimal action is
a = φaα
(
J
J + 1
)
− 1 (24)
and the optimal action of each blockholder is
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
. (25)
The number J of blockholders that acquire information is
J = min{I, n},
where n satisfies
1√
n(n + 1)
σησε = c.
Proposition 7 shows that when I is sufficiently large (greater than n), some blockholders
choose not to acquire information. If all blockholders become informed, competition in trad-
ing is sufficiently fierce that trading profits are insufficient to recoup the cost c. Hence, in
equilibrium, some blockholders remain uninformed and do not participate in the trading stage.
Turning to the optimal number of blockholders, it is never efficient to have I greater than
n. If I > n, then from Proposition 7, some blockholders will not acquire information in equi-
librium. Uninformed blockholders do not trade and thus have no effect on governance through
trading. Moreover, they dilute ownership and reduce incentives to engage in intervention. Un-
informed blockholders are thus unambiguously detrimental to firm value, and so the optimum
involves no such blockholders. This leads to the next proposition.
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Proposition 8. (Firm Value Optimum With Costly Information) The number I∗costly
of blockholders that maximizes firm value with costly information acquisition is equal to
I∗costly = min
(
φa − φb
φb
, n
)
. (26)
If n < φa−φb
φb
, I∗costly and firm value are increasing in ση and σε and decreasing in c. If n ≥ φa−φbφb ,
I∗costly and firm value are independent of ση, σε and c.
I∗costly is weakly increasing in ση and σε and weakly decreasing in c. The intuition is as
follows. If n < φa−φb
φb
, the optimum with costless information I∗ is so large that competition
in trading reduces individual trading profits below the cost of information. Some blockholders
would choose to remain uninformed, and their existence would reduce firm value. The opti-
mum is therefore n, the maximum number under which competition is sufficiently low that all
blockholders become informed. A fall in the cost of information c, an increase in the infor-
mational advantage ση, and a rise in liquidity σε all lead to an increase in net trading profits.
Higher net profits in turn raise n, as they allow greater competition to be sustained before net
profits become negative. This in turn increases I∗costly towards I
∗, and thus raises firm value.
By contrast, if n > φa−φb
φb
, net trading profits are sufficiently high that all blockholders
become informed. The analysis is as in the core model of Section 3, where the optimum
depends only on φa and φb. The constraint that I is sufficiently low to induce information
acquisition is not binding. Changes in net trading profits, and thus changes in ση, σε and c,
have no effect on the optimal number of blockholders or firm value.
4.2 Complementarities
In the core model, the manager’s and blockholders’ actions are perfect substitutes, with in-
dependent effects on firm value. The marginal productivity of the manager’s (blockholders’)
effort is unaffected by the effort level of the other party, i.e. ∂
2v
∂a∂bi
= 0. This assumption likely
applies to a number of settings: for example, rent extraction by the blockholders reduces firm
value regardless of the manager’s effort; managerial initiative is unaffected by blockholder perk
prevention or rent extraction.
In some cases, there may be complementarities between the manager’s and blockholders’
efforts. This subsection extends the core model to these cases. If complementarities are posi-
tive, the marginal productivity of one party’s action is increasing in the effort level of the other
party, i.e. ∂
2v
∂a∂bi
≥ 0. This arises if manager and blockholder outputs are mutually interdepen-
dent – in particular, if the main managerial action is initiative and the main blockholder action
is advising. For example, venture capital investors have expertise in devising an effective strat-
egy, which is then executed by the manager. Both strategy formulation and implementation
are necessary for firm success.
With positive complementarities, blockholders are “allies” of the manager, providing him
with advice. Negative complementarities arise if blockholders are “adversaries” of the manager
– for example, if their main value added is perk prevention, and rent extraction is an important
managerial action. Blockholders are most productive if managerial effort is low ( ∂
2v
∂a∂bi
≤ 0),
i.e. the manager is pursuing private benefits. Negative complementarities are most likely in
mature firms, where the optimal strategy is often clear to the manager. Inefficiencies arise
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Blockholder Action
Advisory Rent Extraction Perk Prevention
Initiative Positive Substitutes Substitutes
Manager Complements
Action Negative
Rent Extraction Substitutes Substitutes Complements
Table 2: Classification of blockholders’ and manager’s actions as substitutes or complements.
not because the manager is unaware of the correct course of action and needs blockholders’
advice, but because he has private incentives to depart from the efficient action. For example,
managers of “cash cows” know that they should return excess cash to shareholders, but may
instead reinvest it inefficiently. Table 2 summaries whether actions are likely to be substitutes
or positive or negative complements depending on their type.
We analyze complementarities using the boundary cases of perfect positive (negative) com-
plementarities, where firm value depends only on the minimum (maximum) output level of the
manager and blockholders, as these scenarios are most tractable within our framework and thus
allow the clearest empirical predictions.18 Reality will typically lie between these two extremes
and the optimum for an interior level of complementarity may be inferred by interpolating
between the boundary cases. For example, we will see that the zero complementarities case of
the core model lies between the two extremes.
We commence with perfect positive complementarities, which we model with a Leontief
production function:
ṽ = min [φa log (1 + a) , φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)] + η̃. (27)
The optimal actions can no longer be derived independently. The manager’s optimal action de-
pends on his conjecture b̂i for the blockholders’ actions. Blockholder i’s optimal action depends
on her conjecture for the manager’s effort (â) and for the actions of the other blockholders (̂bj ,
j 6= i).
Proposition 9. (Perfect Positive Complementarities) The manager’s optimal action is
a = min
(
φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
− 1, exp
(
φb
φa
log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
)
− 1
))
. (28)
18An alternative way to model complementarities is to use a constant elasticity of substitution production
function, e.g. ṽ = [(φa log(1 + a))
ρ + (φb log (1 +
∑
ibi))
ρ]
1/ρ
+ η̃. Such a production function does not yield
tractable solutions in our framework owing to the logarithmic functional form, which is necessary for the core
model (see footnote 10).
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Blockholder i’s effort level is:
bi =



φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
if φa log (1 + â) ≥ φb log
[
1 + φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
+
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
]
exp
(
φa
φb
log (1 + â)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
b̂j − 1
if φb log
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
)
≤ φa log (1 + â) < φb log
[
1 + φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
+
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
]
0 if φa log (1 + â) < φb log
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
)
.
(29)
The number I∗ of blockholders that maximizes firm value is the unique positive solution to
I2
I + 1
=
φbβ
φaα
exp (φb − φa) . (30)
I∗ is increasing in φb and β, and decreasing in φa and α.
As with the core case, I∗ is typically an interior solution, i.e. involves multiple, but finite,
blockholders. However, the comparative statics with respect to φa and φb are opposite to the
core case. In the core case, I∗ is increasing in φa. If managerial effort becomes more productive,
it becomes increasingly important in the trade-off between trading and intervention, and so
I∗ rises to enhance trading. With complements, I∗ must balance the levels of manager and
blockholder outputs. If φa rises, managerial effort is more effective and so it is not necessary
to “boost” it via a high I. Instead, I should be used to enhance blockholder effort so that it
becomes sufficiently high to complement the manager’s output. This involves reducing I.
We now turn to the case of perfect negative complementarities, i.e.
ṽ = max [φa log (1 + a) , φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)] + η̃. (31)
Proposition 10. (Perfect Negative Complementarities) The manager’s optimal action
is
a =
{
φaα
I
I+1
− 1 if α I
I+1
(
φa log
[
φaα
I
I+1
]
− φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)
)
≥φaα II+1 − 1
0 if α I
I+1
(
φa log
[
φaα
I
I+1
]
− φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)
)
<φaα
I
I+1
− 1.
. (32)
Similarly, blockholder i’s effort level is:
bi =



φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
if β
I
(
φb log
[
1 + φbβ
1
I2
− 1
I
+
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
]
− φa log (1 + â)
)
≥φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
0 if β
I
(
φb log
[
1 + φbβ
1
I2
− 1
I
+
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
]
− φa log (1 + â)
)
< φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
.
.
(33)
The number of blockholders I∗ that maximizes firm value is
I∗ =
{
∞ if φa log (φaα) ≥ φb log (φbβ)
1 if φa log (φaα) < φb log (φbβ)
. (34)
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In the core model of perfect substitutes, firm value depends on both manager and block-
holder efforts. Since the optimal shareholder structure must trade-off both, I∗ is typically
an interior solution. Here, firm value depends only on the maximum output level and there
are no trade-off concerns. If blockholder effort is relatively productive, I∗ should be chosen
exclusively to maximize the potency of intervention and completely ignores trading; thus I∗ is
at its minimum value of 1. By contrast, if managerial effort is relatively productive, I∗ = ∞.
This case represents fully dispersed ownership; since empirical studies define a blockholder
as a shareholder who owns above a minimum threshold, it will appear in the data as zero
blockholders. Therefore, under perfect negative complementarities, there is either zero or one
blockholder. Indeed, Table 1 shows that both of these cases are common in the data.
With perfect substitutes, I∗ is smoothly increasing in φa. Here, I
∗ remains weakly increasing
in φa, but φa has a discontinuous effect. If φa log (φaα) < φb log (φbβ), I
∗ is independent of φa.
A small increase in φa has zero effect on I
∗: since blockholder effort is still more productive,
I∗ continues to be exclusively determined by intervention. However, when φa rises above
the level for which φa log (φaα) = φb log (φbβ), I
∗ jumps from 1 to ∞. For φa log (φaα) ≥
φb log (φbβ), I
∗ is already exclusively determined by trading, and so further increases in φa
have no effect on I∗. Similarly, changes in φb have either a zero or infinite effect on I
∗.
Negative complementarities therefore lead to more extreme results than the core model. The
optimal number of blockholders is a corner solution; φa and φb have the same directional effect
as in the core model, but their impacts are discontinuous.
Combining all of the results, with perfect negative complementarities, I∗ is either 1 or
∞ and is driven entirely by the more productive action. As complementarities become less
negative, I∗ becomes less extreme and is determined by the productivity of both actions; it
continues to be increasing in φa and decreasing in φb. The core case of perfect substitutes is
an example. Once complementarities become sufficiently high, we approach the case of perfect
complements, and the effects of φa and φb change direction.
4.3 General Objective Functions
In the core model, the manager’s payoff stems from the market value of his shares, αp̃, as in
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). In a more general setting, the manager can be compensated
according to the fundamental value ṽ as well as the market value p̃, for instance using long-
vesting stock. We thus generalize the manager’s objective function from (10) to
E [α (ωp̃ + (1 − ω)ṽ) − a] . (35)
The actual level of ω will reflect factors outside the model and introduced in earlier work, such as
takeover threat (Stein 1988), concern for managerial reputation (Narayanan 1985; Scharfstein
and Stein 1990), or the manager expecting to sell his shares for p̃ before ṽ is realized, e.g.
to finance consumption (Stein 1989).19 Even if the manager’s sole objective is to maximize
long-run shareholder value, he will care about the stock price as it affects the terms at which
the firm can raise equity at t = 2 (Stein 1996).
Similarly, in the core model, each blockholder maximizes her share of fundamental value less
the cost of effort when choosing her action. More generally, the blockholder may place weight
19Kole (1997) shows that vesting periods are short in practice, perhaps because long vesting periods would
subject the manager to excessive risk.
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on the short-term stock price, for example if she expects to receive a liquidity shock which
will force her to sell her shares in the interim regardless of her private information (Miller and
Rock 1985; Faure-Grimaud and Gromb 2004). We thus generalize each blockholder’s objective
function from (13) to
E
[(
β
I
)
(ζp̃ + (1 − ζ)ṽ) − bi
]
.
The core model has ω = 1 and ζ = 0. The new equilibrium is given below.
Proposition 11. (General Compensation Contract) The number I∗gen of blockholders
that maximizes firm value is the larger root of
φaω
I + 1 − ω −
φb
I
(I + 1)2 − ζ (2I + 1)
I + 1 − ζ = 0 (36)
if equation (36) has solutions for I ≥ 1. In this case, I∗gen is increasing in ω, ζand φa, and
decreasing in φb. If (36) has no solutions for I ≥ 1, I∗ = 1.
As in the core model, I∗gen represents a trade-off between price informativeness and inter-
vention. The positive effect of I on stock price efficiency is more important when the manager
is more closely aligned with the stock price, and so I∗gen increases in the manager’s short-term
concerns ω. Similarly, I∗gen is increasing with blockholders’ short-term concerns ζ . This is
for two reasons. First, when ζ is high, blockholder effort is low: effort affects p̃ to a lesser
extent than ṽ, since the stock price is only partially informative, and so if she places greater
weight on p̃, she is less rewarded for her effort. When intervention is low, the negative effect
of increasing blockholders on intervention is less important. Second, when blockholders care
about the stock price, their effort depends on price informativeness. Since a rise in I raises
price informativeness, this augments their effort.
In addition to generating additional comparative statics for ω and ζ , this extension demon-
strates that the results of the core model do not stem from the fact that we modeled the
blockholders as having a more long-term objective than the manager (i.e. maximize their
share of ṽ while the manager maximizes his share of p̃). Even if blockholders have shorter
horizons than the manager (ζ < ω), the results continue to hold; in fact, the case for multiple
blockholders is even stronger when blockholders have short-term concerns.
4.4 Unobservable Blockholder Actions
This section extends the model to allowing the blockholders’ actions bi to be unobservable.
Now, a blockholder can earn additional trading profits by taking an action different from the
market maker’s conjecture, so we must compute her trading profits off the equilibrium path.
The market maker conjectures an expected firm value of
µ = φa ln (1 + â) + φb ln
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
)
where â and b̂i are his conjectures for the manager’s and blockholders’ actions. However,
blockholder i may choose an action bi 6= b̂i, which will yield a different expected value of
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E [ṽ] = φa ln (1 + â) + φb ln
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j + bi
)
Her trading profits are given by
E [xi(ṽ − p̃)] = E
[
1
(I + 1)λ
(ṽ − µ)
(
ṽ − µ − λ
(
I
(I + 1)λ
(ṽ − µ) + ε
))]
=
1√
I (I + 1)
σησε +
1√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
(
φa log (1 + a) + φb log
(
1 +
∑
i
bi
)
− µ
)2
.
and so her overall objective function is:
max
bi
(
β
I
)
E [v]−bi+
1√
I (I + 1)
σησε+
1√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
(
φa log (1 + a) + φb log
(
1 +
∑
i
bi
)
− µ
)2
(37)
We wish to show that, if the market maker conjectures bi =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
∀ i, then it is indeed
optimal for blockholder i to take action bi =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
.
Proposition 12. (Unobservable Blockholder Actions) If either
β
φb (1 + ln (φbβ))
>
σε
ση
, (38)
or
φbβ − 1
φ2b ln (φbβ)
>
σε
ση
, (39)
then
a = φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
− 1
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
,
is an equilibrium.
The conjectured action bi =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
maximizes the blockholder’s share of firm value less her
cost of intervention. By deviating, the blockholder reduces this objective (the “fundamental
motive”), but also earns additional trading profits since she how has private information on bi
(the “trading motive”.) Either condition (38) or (39) is sufficient to ensure that the trading
motive is sufficiently weak to deter such deviations. The parameters in the conditions are
intuitive. Recall from equation (5) that the sensitivity of the blockholder’s trade to fundamental
value is given by γ = 1√
I
σε
ση
. When φb is higher, a given deviation in bi has a larger effect on
firm value. When σε
ση
is higher, this in turn leads to a greater change in the blockholder’s trade,
and so the trading motive becomes stronger. Thus, conditions (38) and (39) are more likely
to be satisfied if φb and
σε
ση
are low. Similarly, if β is high, the blockholder has a high share of
fundamental value, and so the fundamental motive is stronger.
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If neither condition is satisfied, the actions a and bi stated in Proposition 12 may not
constitute an equilibrium, as trading profits are sufficiently strong that the blockholder will
always wish to deviate from the market maker’s conjecture. In this case, there is no alternative
pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 13. The equilibrium actions stated in Proposition 12 constitute the unique sym-
metric equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, any asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
satisfies
∑
i bi = φbβ/I − 1.
Proposition 13 states that, if actions a and bi stated in Proposition 12 do not constitute
an equilibrium, then there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover,
any asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies must satisfy
∑
i bi = φbβ/I − 1, and therefore
only differs from our equilibrium in terms of the division of rents among blockholders, as in the
case of observable actions studied in Proposition 3. The analysis of mixed strategy equilibria is
beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the trade-off between trading and intervention.
(See Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998) for analysis of mixed strategy equilibria in a
single blockholder model.)
5. Empirical Implications
This paper is motivated by the empirical observation that many firms are held by multiple small
blockholders, in contrast to theories that advocate highly concentrated ownership. The model
generates a number of additional empirical implications, over and above its initial motivation.
It suggests new ways of thinking about blockholders that may give rise to novel directions for
empirical research. First, the paper views blockholders as competing for trading profits rather
than private benefits, thus linking the previously separate blockholder and microstructure
literatures. Second, it suggests studying the number of blockholders rather than (or in addition
to) total ownership or the stake of the largest shareholder. These two broad themes in turn
generate specific predictions for the effects of blockholder structure, and the determinants of
blockholder structure. We commence with the former.
The model suggests that the number of blockholders impacts both financial markets and
firm value. Starting with the first set of effects, it predicts that a greater number of blockholders
reduces total trading profits, but increases price efficiency. Gallagher, Gardner and Swan
(2010) find support for both predictions, Gorton, Huang and Kang (2010) show that price
informativeness is increasing in the number of blockholders and Boehmer and Kelley (2009)
find that it is increasing in the dispersion of ownership among institutional traders (the last two
studies do not investigate trading profits). Turning to the second set, multiple blockholders
can improve firm value, in contrast to existing models that advocate a single concentrated
blockholder.20 Gallagher et al. find that the threat of disciplinary trading from multiple
blockholders leads to superior subsequent firm performance. They use a measure of portfolio
churning to specifically test governance through trading rather than control contests. Smith
and Swan (2008) show that institutional trading is successful at disciplining executive pay.
20If I is always at the firm value optimum, there should be no relationship between I and firm value, when
controlling for the joint determinants of I and firm value. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) made this point in the
context of managerial ownership and firm value. However, the empirically observed I is likely to be the private
optimum, which differs from the firm value optimum. Moreover, the private optimum may shift for exogenous
reasons, such as a blockholder suffering a change in management or a liquidity shock.
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Multiple investors with frequent trading have greatest effect; total institutional ownership only
matters insofar as it affects trading activity. Kandel, Massa and Simonov (2010) find that
multiple shareholders that trade in the same direction are associated with higher firm value
and profitability. Bharath et al. (2010) document that U.S. firms with multiple blockholders
have higher Tobin’s Q than firms with a single blockholder; Laeven and Levine (2007) find a
similar result with international data.
The effect of the number of blockholders on prices and firm value suggests that it is an
important determinant of both market efficiency and corporate governance. Many empirical
papers use total institutional ownership as a measure of market efficiency, since institutions
have greater information than retail traders. However, price efficiency depends not only on the
amount of information held by investors, but the extent to which this information is impounded
into prices. The latter in turn depends on the number of informed shareholders. Similarly,
many studies use total institutional ownership or the stake of the largest investor as a proxy
for corporate governance, but the model suggests that the number of blockholders is another
important factor and thus may be relevant for future empirical work. Bharath et al. (2010) and
Gorton et al. (2010) are two recent empirical studies that investigate the effect of blockholder
numbers, and Konijn et al. (2009) study the effect of blockholder dispersion which is positively
correlated with numbers.
Our model also generates predictions concerning the determinants of blockholder structure.
To our knowledge, none of these predictions have been tested formally as empirical studies have
largely focused on total institutional ownership or the stake of the largest blockholder rather
than the number of blockholders, and so they are potential topics for future research.21 In
the paper, we considered different criteria for the optimal number of blockholders. In practice,
sometimes the social optimum may be observed, for instance if the firm has recently undergone
an IPO, or lock-ups prevent blockholders from re-trading from the initial structure. For most
firms, it is most likely that the private optimum will be observed (see also Maug (1998)).
Importantly, both optima share the same predictions for φa and φb: the number of blockholders
is increasing (decreasing) in the productivity of the manager’s (blockholders’) effort.
We first consider the core model of perfect substitutes. The magnitude of φb depends on
the nature of blockholders’ expertise. Using the terminology of Dow and Gorton (1997), if
blockholders have forward-looking (“prospective”) information about optimal future invest-
ments or strategic choices, intervention is particularly valuable and φb is high. For example,
activist investors (e.g. Kirk Kerkorian or Carl Icahn) are typically expert at preventing perks
or empire-building; venture capitalists have skills in advising. On the other hand, passive
mutual funds and insurance companies typically lack specialist expertise in managing a firm,
but instead are adept at gathering backward-looking (“retrospective”) information to evaluate
the effect of past decisions on firm value. Their primary benefit is to impound the effects of
prior managerial effort into the stock price. In such a case, φb is low and I
∗ is high. Another
determinant of φb is blockholders’ control rights and thus ability to intervene (holding con-
stant the size of their individual stakes).22 Black (1990) and Bebchuk (2007) note that U.S.
shareholders face substantial legal and institutional hurdles to intervention, compared to their
21Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2007) report the number of blockholders, but do not
relate them to cross-sectional determinants.
22In reality, control rights will likely be increasing in the size of each blockholder’s individual stake β/I. This
will reinforce the negative effect of I on intervention currently in this paper.
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foreign counterparts. This reduces φb, thus increasing I
∗, and is consistent with smaller and
more numerous blockholders in the U.S.
The manager’s effectiveness φa will be higher if he is more talented. Talent can be measured
directly using managerial characteristics, such as education, experience or past performance, or
proxied by salary (see Gabaix and Landier (2008)). The manager’s effectiveness φa also depends
on the manager’s scope to use his initiative or extract rents. It is likely lower in regulated firms,
and high in firms with free cash flow problems. The latter implication suggests that mature
firms should be held by many blockholders, which reinforces the earlier predictions. It is also
likely higher in large firms because many managerial actions can be “rolled out” across the
entire firm – for example, if the CEO designs a new method to reduce production costs, this
can be applied firmwide.
Negative complementarities may arise if the manager has significant scope for rent extrac-
tion that can be prevented by intervention, such as in mature firms with high agency costs
of free cash flow. If investors are passive, φa will be significantly higher than φb, and so the
model predicts dispersed ownership. By contrast, if blockholders are activist and skilled in
perk prevention, it is efficient to have a single blockholder. Both of these predictions reinforce
earlier results.
Positive complementarities typically occur in start-up firms. The main managerial action
is initiative, and early-stage investors (such as venture capitalists) are expert at advising the
manager (e.g. by devising a strategy for the manager to implement). Typically, φa will be
significantly greater than φb: the manager is able to add greater value than blockholders, given
his close proximity to firm operations. In such a case, Section 4.2 predicts that I∗ is lower under
positive complementarities than perfect substitutes. Moreover, in start-ups, the manager often
has a significant equity stake (high α) which gives him strong incentives to exert effort. From
equation (30), I∗ should be low to ensure blockholder effort is also high. This may explain the
concentrated blockholder structure in early-stage firms, even after such firms go public and the
trading governance mechanism becomes available.
Section 4.1 shows that if information is costly, the optimal number of blockholders depends
on microstructure features: it is decreasing in the information cost c, increasing in blockholders’
private information ση and increasing in market liquidity σε. Indeed, Fang, Noe and Tice
(2009) find a causal relationship between liquidity and firm value. While many other papers
also generate a positive effect of liquidity on firm value (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole 1993), here
the specific mechanism is through changing blockholder structure. Bharath et al. (2010) find
that liquidity is particularly beneficial for firm value where there are more blockholders. This
is consistent with the model because, if blockholders are numerous, a large volume of noise
trading is necessary to induce them all to gather information.
Turning to the predictions regarding c and ση, we previously established that institutions
skilled at gathering retrospective information have low φb, increasing I
∗. Such institutions also
likely have a low cost of monitoring and superior information, further reinforcing the prediction
that I∗ is high. Indeed, as firms mature, active venture capitalist investors are typically replaced
by passive institutional shareholders, and the number of blockholders usually increases. Note
that this association could be for reasons outside the model. As firms mature, they typically
become larger; if blockholder wealth constraints limit the number of dollars they can invest
in a firm (Winton 1993), this will lead to more dispersed ownership. Therefore, the above
empirical observation is only tentative support for the model; a formal test will have to control
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for factors such as firm size.
The theory also suggests that trading is most important where the manager’s short-term
concerns ω are highest. Therefore, the number of blockholders should be higher when the man-
ager’s stock and options have shorter vesting periods, or takeover defenses are weaker. Again,
simple cross-sectional correlations will be insufficient to support this prediction, since block-
holders can plausibly affect the compensation contract. In addition, the number of blockholders
is increasing in blockholders’ short-term concerns ζ , which could be proxied by blockholders’
trading frequency. Hence the model predicts a positive correlation between the number of
blockholders and trading frequency because of causation in both directions: dispersed block-
holders trade aggressively; and if a firm’s blockholders are frequent traders who rarely intervene,
they should adopt a dispersed structure. Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2010) find evidence
of multiple small blockholders engaging in frequent “churning” trades.
While the theory appears to generate a number of untested predictions through a different
conceptualization of blockholders to prior research, we caveat that empirical testing will have
to overcome a number of challenges. First, although the model yields clear, closed-form predic-
tions for the optimal number of blockholders in terms of certain variables, a number of these
parameters (such as the effectiveness of blockholder and manager effort) are difficult to measure
directly. The key challenge for empiricists is to come up with accurate proxies. Second, while
the model predicts that these variables have a causal impact on blockholder structure, it may
be that additional factors outside the model have an effect on both. Therefore, documenting
correlations will be insufficient to support the model; identification of causal effects will require
careful instrumentation.
6. Conclusion
Why are so many firms held by multiple blockholders when such a shareholding structure gen-
erates free-rider problems in monitoring? This paper offers a potential explanation. The same
co-ordination issues that hinder intervention increase blockholders’ effectiveness in exerting
governance through an alternative mechanism: trading. Multiple blockholders act competi-
tively when trading, impounding more information into prices. This in turn induces higher
managerial effort, particularly if the manager has high stock price concerns.
The optimal number of blockholders depends on the relative productivity of managerial
and blockholder effort. If outputs are perfect substitutes, the optimum is decreasing in the
effectiveness of blockholder intervention and increasing in the potency of managerial effort.
It is therefore high if blockholders are mutual funds that gather retrospective rather than
prospective information, and low if they are activists. This dependence becomes stronger
under negative complementarities. However, if complementarities are positive, the productivity
parameters have opposite effects on the optimal shareholder structure. If blockholder effort
is unproductive, concentrated ownership is necessary to augment it to a sufficient level to
complement the manager’s effort.
The paper suggests a number of potential avenues for future research. On the empirical side,
the model highlights the importance of the number of blockholders. As an independent variable,
it is a relevant determinant of both governance and price efficiency; as a dependent variable, the
model identifies a number of underlying factors that affect the optimal blockholder structure.
On the theoretical side, the paper assumes symmetric blockholders and focuses the analysis on
their optimal number. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to introduce asymmetries
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and examine the optimal distribution of shares between a fixed number of blockholders.23
Another possible asymmetry would be to feature some blockholders specializing in trading and
others in intervention, as in Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), Aghion, Bolton and Tirole
(2004), and Attari, Banerjee and Noe (2006) (although these models feature only one type
of each blockholder). Similarly, while we have focused our study on the efficient number of
blockholders, the model can be expanded to consider the simultaneous determination of the
manager’s stake and total blockholder ownership.
More broadly, the model suggests a new way of thinking about the interactions between
multiple blockholders: as competing for trading profits, rather than private benefits. This
leads to new empirical predictions linking blockholders to microstructure, and more generally
corporate finance to financial markets. In addition, this way of thinking gives rise to new the-
oretical directions: future corporate finance models of multiple blockholders could incorporate
more complex effects currently analyzed in asset pricing models of many informed traders. The
present paper assumes a single trading period, but in reality there may be multiple periods in
which information may arrive and blockholders may trade. Trading profits, and thus incentives
to acquire costly information, then depend not only on the quality of information but its time-
liness. A blockholder who receives information late may find that the price has already moved,
reducing her trading profits. In addition, in the present paper, blockholders trade on informa-
tion only. If blockholders are subject to liquidity shocks (see, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005)), the addition of multiple trading rounds may give incentives for other blockholders to
“front-run” and sell in advance of an anticipated forced liquidation. This may increase the
potency of governance through trading, but reduce incentives to engage in interventions with
long-run benefits.
23Studying asymmetric blockholders will likely require a quite different framework. In the current model (as in
standard Kyle-type models), block size has no effect on trading behavior as the ability to trade is independent of
one’s stake. Introducing short-sale constraints will allow block size to be relevant, but will require departures
from normal noise distributions to obtain tractability (see, e.g., Edmans (2009)). Moreover, a symmetric
equilibrium is necessary to obtain closed-form solutions in the trading stage – see also Kyle (1984), Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993). The current model
does contain an asymmetry in the case of costly information acquisition, as some blockholders may remain
uninformed.
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[52] Konijn, Sander J.J., Roman Kräussl, Andre Lucas (2009): “Blockholder Dispersion and
Firm Value.” Working Paper, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
[53] Kyle, Albert (1984): “Market Structure, Information, Futures Markets, and Price Forma-
tion.” in Gary G. Storey, Andrew Schmitz, and Alexander H. Sarris, eds., International
Agricultural Trade: Advanced Reading in Price Formation, Market Structure, and Price
Instability, Westview, Boulder
[54] Kyle, Albert (1985): “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.” Econometrica 53, 1315-
1335
[55] La Porta, Rafel, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (1999): “Corporate Own-
ership Around the World.” Journal of Finance 54, 471-517
[56] Laeven, Luc and Ross Levine (2007): “Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate
Valuations.” Review of Financial Studies 21, 579-604
[57] Maug, Ernst (1998): “Large Shareholders and Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off Between
Liquidity and Control?” Journal of Finance 53, 65-98
[58] Maug, Ernst (2002): “Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Governance.” European
Economic Review 46, 1569-1597
[59] Maury, Benjamin and Anete Pajuste (2005): “Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm
Value.” Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 1813-1834
[60] McCahery, Joseph, Zacharias Sautner and Laura Starks (2010): “Behind the Scenes: The
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors.” Working Paper, University
of Amsterdam
[61] Mello, Antonio and Rafael Repullo (2004): “Shareholder Activism is Non-Monotonic in
Market Liquidity” Finance Research Letters 1, 2-10
[62] Mikkelson, Wayne and Megan Partch (1985): “Stock Price Effects and Costs of Secondary
Distributions.” Journal of Financial Economics 14, 165-194
[63] Mueller, Holger and Karl Wärneryd (2001): “Inside versus Outside Ownership: A Political
Theory of the Firm.” RAND Journal of Economics 32, 527-541
[64] Narayanan, M. P. (1985): “Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results.” Journal of
Finance 40, 1469-1484
30
[65] Noe, Thomas (2002): “Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure.” Review of
Financial Studies 15, 289-318
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Online Appendix for “Governance Through Trading and
Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders”
Alex Edmans and Gustavo Manso
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. If the market maker uses a linear pricing rule of the form p(y) =
µ + λy, blockholder i maximizes:
E[(ṽ − µ − λy)xi | ṽ = v] = (v − µ − λ
∑
j 6=i
xj)xi − λx2i .
This maximization problem yields
xi(v) =
1
λ
[v − µ − λ
∑
j
xj(v)] ∀i. (40)
Summing both sides across i yields
∑
j
xj (v) =
I
λ
[v − µ − λ
∑
j
xj (v)]
∑
j
xj (v) =
I
(I + 1)λ
[v − µ]
Substituting into (40) yields
xi(v) =
1
(I + 1)λ
[v − µ] ∀i,
which means that, in a linear equilibrium, blockholders’ strategies are symmetric. Total order
flow is thus given by
y =
I
(I + 1) λ
(v − µ) + ε. (41)
The market maker takes the blockholders’ strategies as given and sets
p(y) = E[ṽ|y]. (42)
Using the normality of ṽ and ỹ yields
λ =
√
I
I + 1
ση
σε
,
µ = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) .
From this we obtain:
xi(v) =
1√
I
σε
ση
(v − φa log (1 + a) − φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)) ∀i,
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p(y) = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) +
√
I
I + 1
ση
σε
y,
as required. Blockholder i’s trading profits equal xi (v − p) and can be computed immediately
using the above expressions.
Proof of Proposition 2. The result follows from p (y) = µ + λy and equation (41).
Proof of Proposition 5. Putting equation (18) under a common denominator yields
φaI (I + 1) − φbI (I + 1)2 − φaαI2 + φbβ (I + 1)2
I2 (I + 1)2
= 0. (43)
Equation (18) is a cubic, and has at most three roots. The function is discontinuous at
I = −1 and approaches −∞ either side of I = −1 (since the − φaα
(I+1)2
term dominates). It
is also discontinuous at I = 0 and approaches +∞ either side of I = 0 (since the φbβ
I2
term
dominates). It is continuous everywhere else.
As I → −∞, the −φb
I
term in (18) dominates, and so the function asymptotes the x-axis
from above. Since it approaches −∞ as I rises to −1, and is continuous between I = −∞ and
I = −1, there must be one root between these two points. Similarly, since the function tends to
+∞ as I rises from just above −1 to just below 0, and is continuous between these two points,
there must be a second root within this interval. As I → +∞, the −φb
I
term in (18) again
dominates, and so the function asymptotes the x-axis from below. Since the function tends to
+∞ as I approaches 0 from above, and is continuous between I = 0 and I = +∞, there must
be a third root (Ĩ) between these two points. There can be no other positive roots, since there
are two negative roots and three roots in total. The positive root is a local maximum, since
the gradient is positive for I < Ĩ and negative for I > Ĩ.
Let F (I, θ) denote the left-hand side of (43), where θ is a vector of parameters φa, φb, α,
β. I∗soc is defined by F = 0. Differentiating with respect to θ gives
∂F
∂θ
+
∂F
∂I
∂I
∂θ
= 0.
Since the gradient F is positive just below I∗soc and negative just above I
∗
soc,
∂F
∂I
|I=I∗soc < 0.
Therefore, the sign of ∂I
∂θ
equals the sign of ∂F
∂θ
, which in turn is the cross-partial derivative of
total surplus (19) with respect to I and θ. This generates the comparative statics with respect
to α, β, φa and φb.
Proof of Proposition 6. Equation (20) can be rewritten
2β
(
−φb (I + 1)√
I
+
φa√
I
+
φb (I + 1)
I3/2
)
− I − 1
I + 1
σησε = 0.
Let
F (I) = 2β
(
−φb (I + 1)√
I
+
φa√
I
+
φb (I + 1)
I3/2
)
− I − 1
I + 1
σησε.
We need only consider I ≥ 1. Since 2β
(
−φb(I+1)√
I
+ φa√
I
+ φb(I+1)
I3/2
)
is decreasing in I ∈ [1,∞)
and I−1
I+1
σησε is increasing in I ∈ [1,∞), F (I) is decreasing in [1,∞). Then since F (∞) < 0
and F (1) > 0, there exists a unique root of F (I) = 0 in [1,∞).
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The comparative statics results follow from taking the cross-partial derivatives of the ob-
jective function. The cross-partial with respect to I and β is φa
I(I+1)
− φb
I
+ φb
I2
, which is positive
from equation (20). The other cross-partial derivatives can be immediately signed.
Proof of Proposition 7. The only difference from the previous analysis is that in the action
stage of the game, blockholder i now simultaneously chooses her action bi and whether to
become informed.
We proceed by backwards induction. Let J be the number of blockholders that acquire
information. In the trading stage, uninformed blockholders cannot expect to make profits and
thus do not trade in aggregate. Therefore, only the J informed blockholders trade and the
equilibrium is similar to the one derived in Proposition 1.
Now in the action stage, the manager must choose an action a. Using the same arguments
as in Proposition 3, the manager’s optimal action is
a = φaα
(
J
J + 1
)
− 1. (44)
Blockholders must choose actions bi and whether to become informed. These decisions can
be taken independently since informed trading profits are independent of bi (which is public),
and the choice of bi depends only on blockholder i’s stake β/I. The optimal action of each
blockholder is thus
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
. (45)
From equation (6), if there are I informed blockholders, then each blockholder’s trading profits
are given by:
1√
I(I + 1)
σησε.
A blockholder will acquire information if and only if her trading profits are higher than c. This
gives the number J of blockholders that decide to become informed in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let n and J(I) be as given in Proposition 7. Using the results of
Proposition 3, expected firm value is
E[ṽ] = φa log
[
φaα
(
J(I)
J(I) + 1
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
. (46)
We wish to maximize the above expression with respect to I. Since J(I) = n for I ≥ n,
it is never optimal to increase I beyond n since it reduces the second term in the firm value
while keeping the first term constant. Therefore, I∗costly ≤ n. When I ≤ n, J(I) = I and the
problem is the same as in Proposition 4. From (15) we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 9. The manager will not exert effort above the level for which
φa log (1 + a) = φb log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
)
,
i.e.
34
a = exp
(
φb
φa
log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
))
− 1.
This derives the optimal a as given in equation (28). Similarly, blockholder i will not exert
effort above the level for which
φb log
(
1 + bi +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
)
= φa log (1 + â) ,
i.e.
bi = exp
(
φa
φb
log (1 + â)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
b̂j − 1.
A Nash equilibrium requires the following three conditions to hold:
φb log (1 + Ibi) = φa log (1 + a) .
a ≤ φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
− 1
bi ≤ φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
.
If the first condition was violated, then the party producing the higher output would gain
by reducing effort. The two inequality conditions represent the maximum levels of effort that
the manager and blockholders will exert, given the marginal cost of effort.
Out of the continuum of potential Nash equilibria, we seek the one that maximizes firm
value. Since firm value is increasing in both a and bi, it is clear that at least one incentive
compatibility constraint will bind. If neither constraint binds, then all parties are exerting
suboptimal effort. We could raise the effort levels of all parties while maintaining the equality
condition and violating neither constraint.
We now show that, in fact, both constraints will bind. Consider the case where bi =
φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
. (Starting with a = φaα
(
I
I+1
)
− 1 leads to the same result). Then we have
φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
= φa log (1 + a)
a = exp
(
φb
φa
log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)])
− 1.
Recall that we also require a ≤ φaα
(
I
I+1
)
− 1. Hence firm value is optimized by solving:
max
I
exp
(
φb
φa
log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)])
s.t. exp
(
φb
φa
log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)])
≤ φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
.
The constraint will bind, and so we obtain
φa log
[
φaα
(
I
I + 1
)]
= φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
. (47)
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The firm value optimum setting I to ensure all parties exert their “full” effort levels. The
intuition is as follows. Consider a Nash equilibrium where the blockholders are exerting their
full effort (i.e. bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
), and the manager is not (i.e. a < φaα
(
I
I+1
)
− 1). bi is thus
constrained by I via the equation bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
, and so firm value rises if I is reduced
to relax this constraint and allow bi to rise. Unlike in the core model, we do not have the
side-effect that reducing I decreases a. I only determines the upper bound to a, not its level.
Since a < φaα
(
I
I+1
)
− 1, the upper bound is not a constraint anyway. Rather than declining,
a will rise to accompany the increase in bi and ensure that φb log (1 + Ibi) = φa log (1 + a) still
holds.
From equation (47), the optimal number of blockholders is determined implicitly by:
I2
I + 1
=
φbβ
φaα
exp (φb − φa) = Z.
Using the quadratic formula, the unique positive solution is
I =
Z +
√
Z2 + 4Z
2
,
which is increasing in φb and β, and decreasing in φa and α.
Proof of Proposition 10. We now allow the non-negativity constraints to bind. Deriving
p̃ as in the main model and solving the manager’s objective function, he will choose either
a = φaα
I
I+1
− 1 or a = 0. If φa log
[
φaα
I
I+1
]
< φb log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
)
, exerting a = φaα
I
I+1
− 1
will have no effect on p̃ and so the manager will choose a = 0. Even if φa log
[
φaα
I
I+1
]
≥
φb log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
)
, it is not automatic that the manager will exert effort. Exerting effort in-
creases p̃ not by I
I+1
φa log
[
φaα
I
I+1
]
, as in the core model, but by only
I
I + 1
(
φa log
[
φaα
I
I + 1
]
− φb log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
))
because blockholder effort “supports” firm value even if a = 0. Hence the manager chooses
a = φaα
I
I+1
− 1 if and only if
α
I
I + 1
(
φa log
[
φaα
I
I + 1
]
− φb log
(
1 +
∑
ib̂i
))
≥ a.
and so the optimal a is as given by (32). Blockholder i’s effort level is derived similarly.
There are two candidates for a Nash equilibrium:
{
a = 0, bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2 − 1
I
a = φaα
I
I+1
− 1, bi = 0 .
Firm value is thus either φa log
[
φaα
I
I+1
]
or φb log
[
φbβ
1
I
]
. The former is monotonically in-
creasing in I, and maximized at φa log (φaα) for I = ∞. The latter is monotonically decreasing
in I, and maximized at φb log (φbβ) for I = 1. Thus I
∗ is as given in (34).
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Proof of Proposition 11. Proceeding as in the main model, the actions are given by
a = φaα
[
1 − ω
I + 1
]
− 1 (48)
and
bi = φbβ
[
ζ
I (I + 1)
+
1 − ζ
I2
]
− 1
I
. (49)
Firm value is given by:
E[ṽ] = φa ln
[
φaα
[
1 − ω
I + 1
]]
+ φb ln
[
φbβ
[
ζ
I + 1
+
1 − ζ
I
]]
. (50)
The first-order condition is given by (36). Putting this under a common denominator yields
F (I, ω, ζ) =
I (I + 1 − ζ)φaω − φb
[
(I + 1)2 − ζ (2I + 1)
]
(I + 1 − ω)
I (I + 1 − ω) (I + 1 − ζ) .
It is a cubic, and has at most three roots. If I → ±∞, the numerator becomes dominated by
the term containing (I + 1)2 and so F tends to −φb(I+1)
2
I(I+1−ζ) . It thus asymptotes the x-axis from
below. If I → 0 or I → − (1 − ζ), then F tends to −φb[(I+1)
2−ζ(2I+1)]
I(I+1−ζ) . For I close to 0, we have
(I+1)2−ζ(2I+1)
I(I+1−ζ) > 0 and so the sign depends on −
φb
I
. It is positive (negative) as I approaches
0 from below (above). For I close to − (1 − ζ), we have (I+1)
2−ζ(2I+1)
I
< 0 and so the sign
depends on φb
I+1−ζ . It is negative (positive) as I approaches − (1 − ζ) from below (above). If
I → − (1 − ω), then F tends to φaω
I+1−ω and is negative (positive) as I approaches − (1 − ω)
from below (above).
To identify the roots, consider − (1 − ζ) < − (1 − ω). (The same arguments apply for
− (1 − ω) < − (1 − ζ).) At I = −∞, F asymptotes the x-axis from below, and declines until
it reaches −∞ when I is just below − (1 − ζ), so there are no roots for I < − (1 − ζ). When
I is just above − (1 − ζ), F → ∞. It then decreases, crosses through zero and becomes −∞
just below − (1 − ω). There is one root for − (1 − ζ) < I < − (1 − ω). F → ∞ just above
I = − (1 − ω) and just below I = 0, so there are either 0 or 2 roots for − (1 − ω) < I < 0.
Thus, there can be at most 2 roots for I > 0. F → −∞ when I is just above 0, and asymptotes
the x-axis from below as I → ∞. Therefore, F crosses the x-axis either 0 or 2 times for I > 0.
If F has no roots, it is negative for all I > 0 and so the optimal number of blockholders is its
minimum value of 1. If it has two roots greater than 1, the upper root Iu is the maximum since
the derivative is positive below Iu and negative above Iu. As in the proof of Proposition 5, the
cross-partials are sufficient to determine the sign of the comparative statics. The cross-partials
with respect to φa and φb are immediate. For ω and ζ , we have:
∂2E[v]
∂I∂ω
=
φa
(I + 1 − ω)2 > 0
∂2E[v]
∂I∂ζ
=
φb
(I + 1 − ζ)2
> 0.
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Proof of Proposition 14. Suppose the market maker uses a linear pricing rule of the form
p(y) = µ + λy and blockholders use a linear demand of the form xi(ν) = γ(ν̃ − µ). Then
blockholder i maximizes:
E[(ṽ − µ − λy)xi | ν̃i = ν] =
(
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
δ
(ν − µ) − λ(I − 1)γ
(
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
δ
(ν − µ)
))
xi − λx2i .
This maximization problem yields
xi(ν) =
1
2λ
[
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
δ
(ν − µ) − λ(I − 1)γ
(
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
δ
(ν − µ)
)]
∀i.
The strategies of the blockholders are symmetric and we thus have
xi(ν) =
1
2
(
1
λ
− (I − 1)γ
)
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
δ
(ν − µ) ∀i.
which implies that
γ =
σ2η
((I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ )λ
The market maker takes the blockholders’ strategies as given and sets
p(y) = E[ṽ|y]. (51)
Using the normality of ṽ and ỹ yields
λ =
√
I(σ2δ + σ
2
η)σ
2
η
σε((I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ )
µ = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) .
From this we obtain:
xi(νi) =
σε√
I(σ2δ + σ
2
η)
(νi − φa log (1 + a) − φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)) ∀i,
p(y) = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) +
√
I(σ2δ + σ
2
η)σ
2
η
σε((I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ )
y,
as required.
Proof of Proposition 12. Dropping terms that do not contain bi, blockholder i’s objective
function (37) becomes
max
bi
(
β
I
)
φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) − bi +
1√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
(φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) − µ)
2
Given the conjecture bi =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
, we have
µ = φa ln (1 + a) + φb ln
(
φbβ
I
)
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and so the objective becomes
max
bi
(
β
I
)
φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) − bi +
1√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
E
[(
φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) − φb log
(
φbβ
I
)
+ η
)2]
with first-order condition
φbβ
I (1 +
∑
ibi)
− 1 + 2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
(
φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) − φb log
(
φbβ
I
))
φb
(1 +
∑
ibi)
= 0. (52)
where
1 +
∑
ibi =
1
I
+
I − 1
I2
φbβ + bi.
One solution is bi =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
. The second-order condition is:
− φbβ
I (1 +
∑
ibi)
2 +
2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση


− φb(
1+
∑
ibi
)2
(
φb ln (1 +
∑
ibi) − φb ln
(
φbβ
I
))
+ φb(
1+
∑
ibi
) φb(
1+
∑
ibi
)


which has the same sign as
−β
I
+
2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
φb
(
1 −
(
ln
(
1
I
+
I − 1
I2
φbβ + bi
)
− ln
(
φbβ
I
)))
.
To show that bi =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
is a global maximum, it is sufficient to show that the function
is globally concave, i.e. is negative for all bi. Since the second-order condition is decreasing in
bi, it is sufficient to show that it is negative when bi is at its lowest possible value of 0. Then,
it becomes
−β
I
+
2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
φb
(
1 −
(
ln
(
I − 1
I2
φbβ +
1
I
)
− ln
(
1
I
φbβ
)))
< 0 (53)
which is satisfied if
−β
I
+
2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
φb
(
1 + ln
(
1
I
φbβ
))
< 0.
Since I ≥ 1, this is in turn satisfied if
−β + 2
√
I
(I + 1)
σε
ση
φb (1 + ln (φbβ)) < 0.
Since
√
I
(I+1)
is decreasing in I, a sufficient condition is
β
φb (1 + ln (φbβ))
>
σε
ση
, (54)
i.e. (38).
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The alternative sufficient condition is obtained without studying second-order conditions.
First, observe that plugging bi = ∞ into the objective function yields a value of −∞, so the
global maximum is either bi = 0 or involves bi satisfying the first-order condition (52). Defining
A =
1
I
+
I − 1
I2
φbβ,
B =
φbβ
I
,
C =
φbβ
I2
− 1
I
= B − A,
K =
2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
φ2b ,
the first-order condition (52) can be rewritten:
B
A + bi
− 1 + K
A + bi
ln
(
A + bi
B
)
= 0
C − bi + K ln
(
1 +
bi − C
B
)
= 0. (55)
As considered above, bi = C is a solution to the first-order condition. If bi 6= C, then the
first-order condition can be rewritten as
−1 + K
bi − C
ln
(
1 +
bi − C
B
)
= 0. (56)
Note that the function ln(1+x)/x is decreasing in x, and so −1+ K
bi−C ln
(
1 + bi−C
B
)
is decreasing
in bi. If −1 − KC ln
(
1 − C
B
)
< 0, then (56) has no solution. Then bi = C is the unique solution
for (55). Also note that −1 − K
C
ln
(
1 − C
B
)
< 0 implies that ∂f(bi)
∂bi
|bi=0 > 0, and so bi = 0
cannot be the global maximum. Hence, if −1 − K
C
ln
(
1 − C
B
)
< 0, the global maximum must
be bi = C. This sufficient condition implies −C < K ln
(
1 − C
B
)
, which eventually yields:
1 >
2
√
I
(I + 1)
σε
ση
φb
β
ln
(
1 − 1
I
+
1
φbβ
)
1
1
φbβ
− 1
I
(57)
Since ln(1+x)
x
is decreasing in x, the function
ln
(
1 − 1
I
+
1
φbβ
)
1
1
φbβ
− 1
I
is decreasing in I. Also note that the function
2
√
I
(I + 1)
σε
ση
φb
β
is decreasing in I for I ≥ 1. Thus
2
√
I
(I + 1)
σε
ση
φb
β
ln
(
1 − 1
I
+
1
φbβ
)
1
1
φbβ
− 1
I
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is decreasing in I for I ≥ 1. Hence a sufficient condition for (57) to hold is that
1 >
σε
ση
φb
β
ln
(
1
φbβ
)
1
1
φbβ
− 1
σε
ση
<
φbβ − 1
φ2b ln (φbβ)
. (58)
Note that sufficient condition (54) or (58) may be weaker, depending on parameter values,
so we provide them both in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose the conjectured equilibrium actions are b̂i such that∑
i b̂i 6= φbβ/I − 1. Can bi = b̂i be an optimal response of blockholder i?
We first analyze the case
∑
i b̂i > 0. In this case, there exists i such that b̂i > 0. Blockholder
i’s objective function (37) becomes
max
bi
(
β
I
)
φb log
(
1 + bi +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
)
− bi
+
1√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
E


(
φa log (1 + a) + φb log
(
1 + bi +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
)
+ η − µ
)2
 (59)
with
µ = φa ln (1 + a) + φb ln
(
1 +
∑
i
b̂i
)
.
The first-order condition is
0 =

 φbβ
I
(
1 + bi +
∑
j 6=i b̂j
) − 1


+
2√
I (I + 1)
σε
ση
(
φa log (1 + a) + φb log
(
1 + bi +
∑
j 6=i
b̂j
)
− µ
)
φb
1 + bi +
∑
j 6=i b̂j
(60)
When bi = b̂i, the second term on the right-hand side of (60) is equal to zero. However,
the first term on the right-hand side of (60) is different from zero since
∑
i b̂i 6= φbβ/I − 1.
The first-order condition cannot be satisfied and thus we cannot have
∑
i b̂i 6= φbβ/I − 1 and∑
i b̂i > 0 at the same time.
The only other possible symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies involves
∑
i b̂i = 0, which
implies b̂i = 0 for all i. For this to be an equilibrium, we would need the right-hand side of
(60) to be negative at bi = b̂i = 0. Since we have Ibi =
φbβ
I
− 1 > 0, we have φbβ > I and so
this cannot be the case.
Sufficient Conditions for a > 0 and bi > 0. From (7), we have
a = φaα
(
I
I + 1
)
− 1.
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Since I ≥ 1, I
I+1
≥ 1
2
and so a sufficient condition for a ≥ 0 is
φaα ≥ 2.
The sufficient conditions for bi ≥ 0 depend on the variant of the model we are considering.
We start with the analysis of the firm value optimum in the core model, Proposition 4, which
yielded I∗ = φa−φb
φb
. From (9), we have
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
,
and so bi = 0 at I = φbβ. Thus,
φa−φb
φb
< φbβ is sufficient to guarantee that bi > 0 at
I = φa−φb
φb
. However, in the presence of non-negativity constraints, firm value (16) is no longer
a concave function of I and so an additional condition is necessary to guarantee that I = φa−φb
φb
is a global, rather than only local, optimum. While increasing I above φa−φb
φb
initially reduces
firm value (because the detrimental effect on intervention outweighs the beneficial effect on
trading), once I hits φbβ, intervention is already at its minimum level of zero. Thus, further
increases in I have no negative effect on intervention, but continue to improve trading, and
thus unambiguously boost firm value. The global optimum may be either I = φa−φb
φb
or I = ∞.
For I = φa−φb
φb
, we have
E [v] = φa log
(
φaα
I
I + 1
)
+ φb log
(
φbβ
1
I
)
= (φa − φb) log (φa − φb) + φa log α + φb log
(
φ2bβ
)
,
and for I = ∞, we have
E [v] = φa log (φaα) .
Thus,
(φa − φb) log (φa − φb) + φb log
(
φ2bβ
)
> φa log φa
is sufficient to guarantee that I∗ = φa−φb
φb
in the presence of non-negativity constraints.
Similar analysis yields sufficient conditions for the analysis of the social optimum, Propo-
sition 5, as
I∗soc < φbβ,
φa log
[
φaα
(
I∗soc
I∗soc + 1
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I∗soc
)]
− φaα
(
I∗soc
I∗soc + 1
)
− φbβ
1
I∗soc
> φa log (φaα) − φaα,
where I∗soc is defined by (18). The sufficient conditions for the analysis of the private optimum,
Proposition 6, are
I∗priv < φbβ,
β
{
φa log
[
φaα
(
I∗priv
I∗priv + 1
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
1
I∗priv
]}
− φbβ
1
I∗priv
+
√
I∗priv
I∗priv + 1
σησε > βφa log (φaα) ,
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where I∗priv is defined by (20). The sufficient conditions for the model with the general objective
function, Proposition 11, are
I∗gen < φbβ
φa ln
[
φaα
[
1 − ω
I∗gen + 1
]]
+ φb ln
[
φbβ
[
ζ
I∗gen + 1
+
1 − ζ
I∗gen
]]
> φa ln (φaα) ,
where I∗gen is defined by (36). The sufficient conditions for the model with imperfect signals,
Proposition 17, are
(φa − φb)(2σ2δ + σ2η)
φbσ2η
> φbβ
(φa − φb) log (φa − φb) + φb log
[
φb
2βσ2η
(2σ2δ + σ
2
η)
]
> φa log φa.
For the analysis of perfect positive complementarities (Proposition 9), it is automatic that
the optimum cannot involve a non-negativity constraint binding, since firm value is zero if a
or
∑
ibi is zero. For perfect negative complementarities (Proposition 10), we do allow for a or∑
ibi to be zero, and indeed the optimum involves one of these terms being zero.
B Imperfect Signals
The key mechanism through which we achieve the optimality of a multiple blockholder structure
is the positive effect of blockholder numbers on price informativeness. It is therefore important
to verify the robustness of this result to other specifications of the information structure. In
the core model, blockholders have perfect information about firm value ṽ; Appendix C shows
that the results hold with imperfect signals when blockholders receive the same signal. Here,
we consider the case in which blockholders observe imperfect and uncorrelated signals.
Each blockholder observes a signal ν̃i = ṽ + δ̃i where δ̃i, i ∈ I are independent and δ̃i ∼
N (0, σ2δ ). Propositions 14-17 are the analogs of Propositions 1-4 in the core model.
Proposition 14. (Trading Equilibrium) The unique linear equilibrium of the trading stage
is symmetric and has the form:
xi(ν̃i) = γ (ν̃i − φa log (1 + a) − φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)) ∀i (61)
p(ỹ) = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) + λỹ, (62)
where
λ =
√
I(σ2δ + σ
2
η)σ
2
η
σε((I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ )
(63)
γ =
σε√
I(σ2δ + σ
2
η)
, (64)
and a and bi are the market maker’s and blockholders’ conjectures regarding the actions.
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Proposition 15. (Price Informativeness) Price informativeness is equal to
Iσ2η
(I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ
.
Proposition 16. (Optimal Actions) The manager’s optimal action is
a = φaα
(
Iσ2η
(I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ
)
− 1 (65)
and the optimal action of each blockholder is
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
. (66)
Proposition 17. (Firm Value Optimum) The optimal number I∗ of blockholders maxi-
mizes:
E[ṽ] = φa log
[
φaα
(
Iσ2η
(I + 1)σ2η + 2σ
2
δ
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
. (67)
Solving the maximization problem, we obtain:
I∗ =
(φa − φb)(2σ2δ + σ2η)
φbσ2η
. (68)
The number of blockholders has exactly the same effects as in the core model. An increase
in I raises price informativeness (Proposition 15) and thus managerial effort (Proposition
16), but reduces blockholder effort. Therefore, I∗ remains increasing in φa and decreasing in
φb (Proposition 17). An additional result in the case of imperfect signals is that I
∗ is also
increasing in the noise in the blockholders’ signals σ2δ and decreasing in the variance of firm
value σ2η . Proposition 15 shows that, if σ
2
η is high, price informativeness is already high under
a single blockholder, and so there is less scope to increase it further through augmenting I.
The opposite intuition applies to the effect of σδ.
The model can also be extended to multiple trading rounds and long-lived private infor-
mation. Since these extensions have been undertaken in the microstructure literature (albeit
without linking price informativeness to manager actions), we can use these prior studies to
establish the robustness of our results. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1993) consider the effect of competition among identically informed investors
with long-lived private information. As in our model, they find that price discovery is acceler-
ated when compared to Kyle’s monopolistic case. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) extend the
analysis to the case of heterogeneously informed investors and show that the degree of compe-
tition depends on the correlation structure of investors’ signals. In particular, competition is
more intense when the correlation between initial signals is high.
Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) extend the Kyle model to continuous time and a general
correlation structure of investors’ signals. They show that price informativeness is again higher
under multiple informed traders for some fixed initial period, after which the relationship
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reverses. This fixed initial period is typically a very long time, and only ends close to the
public announcement date. Thus, price informativeness is higher under multiple informed
traders for all but the very end of the trading period. It is the initial period that is relevant for
our setting: the microfoundations for the manager’s stock price concerns discussed in Section
4.3 show that the stock price the manager cares about is a long time before the date when
fundamental value is publicly released. For example, the manager can be fired (for a low stock
price), headhunted (for a high stock price), sell his own shares or raise equity within a few
months. By contrast, the recent corporate scandals and financial crisis highlight that it may
take several years for fundamental value to become known.
As discussed in more detail in Section 5, empirical evidence also supports the robustness
of our model. In the real world, blockholders have heterogenous signals and there are multiple
trading periods. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) and Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2010) find
that competition among blockholders increases price efficiency.
C Precision of Information Varies with I
In the core model, all blockholders observe the value of the firm perfectly. We now allow
for blockholders to receive the same noisy signal, the precision of which is increasing in each
blockholder’s stake (β/I) and thus decreasing in the number of blockholders I. Blockholders
now observe a signal ν̃ = ṽ + δ̃ where δ̃ ∼ N (0, σ2δ (I)). We show that the results of the core
model are unchanged as long as signal precision does not decline too rapidly with I.24
Proposition 18. (Trading Equilibrium) The unique linear equilibrium of the trading stage
is symmetric and has the form:
xi(ν̃) = γ (ν̃ − φa log (1 + a) − φb log (1 +
∑
ibi)) ∀i (69)
p(ỹ) = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) + λỹ, (70)
where
λ =
√
I
I + 1
σ2η
σε(
√
σ2η + σδ(I)
2)
(71)
γ =
1√
I
σε√
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
, (72)
and a and bi are the market maker’s and blockholders’ conjectures regarding the actions.
Proof If the market maker uses a linear pricing rule of the form p(y) = µ + λy, blockholder i
maximizes:
E[(ṽ − µ − λy)xi | ν̃ = ν] =
(
σ2η
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
ν − µ − λ
∑
j 6=i
xj
)
xi − λx2i .
24Appendix B considers noisy and uncorrelated signals. Here, blockholders receive the same signal. This
represents the toughest case for our model, since it means that the amount of information in the economy
declines as I rises – there is a single signal which becomes less precise.
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This maximization problem yields
xi(ν) =
1
λ
[
σ2η
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
ν − µ − λ
∑
j
xj(ν)
]
∀i.
The strategies of the blockholders are symmetric and we thus have
xi(ν) =
σ2η
(I + 1)λ(σ2η + σδ(I)
2)
(ν − µ) ∀i.
Total order flow is thus given by
y =
I
(I + 1) λ
σ2η
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
(v − µ) + ε. (73)
The market maker takes the blockholders’ strategies as given and sets
p(y) = E[ṽ|y]. (74)
Using the normality of ṽ and ỹ yields
λ =
√
I
I + 1
σ2η
σε(
√
σ2η + σδ(I)
2)
µ = φa log (1 + a) + φb log (1 +
∑
ibi) .
From this we obtain:
xi(ν) =
σε√
I
1√
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
(ν − φa log (1 + a) − φb (1 +
∑
ibi)) ∀i,
p(y) = φa log (1 + a) + φb (1 +
∑
ibi) +
√
I
I + 1
σ2η
σε(
√
σ2η + σδ(I)
2)
y,
as required.
The next proposition calculates price informativeness.
Proposition 19. (Price Informativeness) Price informativeness is equal to
I
I + 1
σ2η
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
Proof The result follows from p (y) = µ + λy and equation (73).
It is easy to see that if σδ(I) does not increase too quickly, then price informativeness is
increasing in I. As in the core model, when I increases, blockholders trade more competitively
and impound more information into prices. This outweighs the fact that there is less infor-
mation in the economy and each blockholder has less precise information. Also as in the core
model, liquidity σε has no effect on price informativeness.
We now solve for the actions of the manager and the blockholders in the first stage.
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Proposition 20. (Optimal Actions) The manager’s optimal action is
a = φaα
(
I
I + 1
σ2η
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
)
− 1 (75)
and the optimal action of each blockholder is
bi = φbβ
(
1
I
)2
− 1
I
. (76)
Proof The manager maximizes the market value of his shares, less the cost of effort:
E [αp̃ − a] . (77)
When setting the price p̃, the market maker uses his conjecture for the manager’s action a.
Therefore, the manager’s actual action affects the price only through its influence on ṽ, and
thus blockholders’ order flow. The manager’s first-order condition is given by:
α
(
E
[
dp̃
dṽ
])(
φa
1 + a
)
− 1 = 0. (78)
From Proposition 19, we obtain (75). The action of each blockholder is the same as in the
paper.
If σδ(I) does not increase too quickly, the number of blockholders has a positive impact
on managerial effort a. The mechanism is the same as in the core model. An increase in the
number of blockholders makes prices more informative, increasing the reward to the manager
for exerting effort. As in the core model, increasing the number of blockholders always has a
negative impact on blockholders effort bi.
The optimal number I of blockholders maximizes:
E[ṽ] = φa log
[
φaα
(
I
I + 1
σ2η
σ2η + σδ(I)
2
)]
+ φb log
[
φbβ
(
1
I
)]
. (79)
It is easy to see that the optimal number of blockholders is strictly higher than 1 if σδ(I)
does not increase too quickly. The intuition is similar to the core model. On one hand, an
increase in I exacerbates the free-rider problem and hinders intervention. On the other hand,
an increase in I can raise price informativeness and thus managerial effort. In this extension,
there is an additional negative effect of raising I, which is that each blockholder becomes less
informed. The optimal number of blockholders is thus lower than in the core model.
D Measures of Price Informativeness
This section proves that our measure or price informativeness, E
[
dp̃
dṽ
]
, is equivalent to the
measure commonly used in the microstructure literature, (Var(ṽ) − Var(ṽ|p̃)) / Var(ṽ).
Using the formula for the conditional variance of a bivariate normal distribution
Var(ṽ|p̃) = (1 − Corr(ṽ, p̃)2) Var(ṽ),
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we have
(Var(ṽ) − Var(ṽ|p̃)) / Var(ṽ) = Corr(ṽ, p̃)2. (80)
Since, in equilibrium, the price is a linear function of ṽ and ε̃,
E
[
dp̃
dṽ
]
=
Cov(ṽ, p̃)
Var(ṽ)
.
From the law of iterated expectations and (42),
Var(p̃) = Cov(ṽ, p̃).
Therefore,
Corr(ṽ, p̃)2 = E
[
dp̃
dṽ
]
. (81)
Combining (80) and (81) shows that
E
[
dp̃
dṽ
]
= (Var(ṽ) − Var(ṽ|p̃)) / Var(ṽ).
References
[1] Back, Kerry, C. Henry Cao, and Gregory A. Willard (2000): “Imperfect Competition
among Informed Traders.” Journal of Finance 55, 2117-2155
[2] Foster, F. Douglas and S. Viswanathan (1996): “Strategic Trading When Agents Fore-
cast the Forecast of Others.”Journal of Finance 51, 1437-1478
48
